Institutional Structure in the Implementation of Special Autonomy: A Rational Choice Institutionalism Analysis of Papua Barat Daya Province, Indonesia

Abstract

Special Autonomy (Otsus) in Papua, established through Law No. 21/2001 and revised by Law No. 2/2021, represents an asymmetric decentralisation policy designed to address historical inequalities affecting Indigenous Papuans. In Papua Barat Daya, a newly established province, Otsus implementation continues to face institutional dysfunction marked by overlapping authority, vertical-horizontal fragmentation, unclear inter-agency roles, and weak coordination capacity. This study analyses how institutional structure shapes the effectiveness of Otsus implementation using Shepsle’s Rational Choice Institutionalism, focusing on authority distribution, vertical-horizontal synchronisation, and cross-level coordination structures. A qualitative case-study design was employed through in-depth interviews with provincial officials, DPRP and MRP members, technical agency heads, district heads, customary leaders, and Indigenous Papuan representatives. Data were supplemented by focus group discussions and document analysis of Otsus laws and regulations, implementing government regulations, presidential regulations, provincial budget documents, and audit reports. Thematic analysis was conducted using open and axial coding in NVivo, supported by source and method triangulation. The findings show that Otsus dysfunction stems from a persistent mismatch between formal authority and actual capacity. MRP and DPRP possess strong normative mandates but lack sufficient budgets, execution instruments, and operational capacity. Meanwhile, central government retains de facto control over technical-fiscal regulation, reflected in 90.4% provincial revenue dependence on central transfers. Coordination structures remain weakly institutionalised, figure-dependent, administratively costly, and more oriented toward filtering procedures than channelling community aspirations. These conditions generate defensive, sectoral, and opportunistic actor behaviour rather than collaborative implementation. The study concludes that Otsus effectiveness depends on clarifying authority, reducing coordination costs, and realigning actor incentives toward Indigenous Papuan affirmation. Its contribution lies in conceptualising “immature administrative equilibrium” as a structure-induced equilibrium in which formal rules stabilise procedure without producing substantive coordination.