From Nuclear Diplomacy to Regional Escalation: The Iranian Nuclear Issue and the Transformation of U.S. Strategy in the Middle East

Abstract

This article analyzes the impact of the Iranian nuclear issue on U.S. strategy in the Middle East during the post-JCPOA period from 2018 until the end of 2024. This theory-guided qualitative case study, informed by escalation theory, the security dilemma, deterrence theory, and gray-zone conflict, contends that the nuclear issue should be perceived not merely as a non-proliferation problem, but as a structural escalatory variable connecting nuclear uncertainty to broader regional confrontations. The article characterizes the JCPOA as a provisional framework for managing escalation rather than a thorough strategic resolution. The agreement decreased nuclear uncertainty via technical constraints and monitoring, although it failed to address the fundamental rivalry among Iran, the United States, Israel, and Iran-supported armed groups. Subsequent to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA in 2018, these limitations diminished, facilitating a more direct interplay between nuclear ambiguity, proxy warfare, maritime instability, and explicit interstate signaling. The article finds that this resulted in a scenario more accurately described as managed instability rather than a solid strategic order.